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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Argument 
In this action, EVCO Sound and Electronics, Inc. ("EVCO") seeks payment against Seaboard 
Surety Company's ("Seaboard") payment bond issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-1927 and for 
breach of contract against Cedar Street Electric and Control, Inc. ("Cedar Street"). The matter 
proceeded to trial before the Honorable John T. Mitchell in August, 2007. The court issued its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on November 19, 2007, entering judgment in 
favor of EVCO and against Seaboard finding that EVCO and Cedar Street had entered into an 
express contract by virtue of their conduct and that EVCO's claims and suit were timely filed. 
Seaboard is appealing from this judgment. 
To prevail on its claim against Seaboard, EVCO must prove (I) it had a contract to supply 
labor and materials to Cedar Street and that as a lower tier subcontractor, (2) it provided proper 
notice to the general contractor within 90 days ofEVCO's last labor and materials, and (3) it filed 
suit within one year of the date it last supplied labor and materials. 
Seaboard's appeal relates to both the contract formation issues between EVCO and Cedar 
Street, as well as the notice and limitations issues. Regarding the contract formation issues, 
Seaboard submits that the district court erred as a matter of Jaw and disregarded well established 
Idaho law concerning contract formation in holding that EVCO and Cedar Street created an express 
contract by their conduct. Prior to trial, the district court in its Order Denying Summary Judgment, 
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determined there was no express crontact established between EVCO and Cedar Street. The district 
court stated: 
In turn, Cedar Street entered into negotiations with plaintiff Evco Sound & 
Electronics, Inc., to perform portions of the "low voltage" electrical work on the 
project. Evco proposed to supply labor and materials to Cedar Street for the fire 
alarm, intercom, telephone and television media section of the project. 
Although Evco and Cedar Street discussed the scope of the work and looked to enter 
into a written subcontract, the parties never entered into a formal express contract. 
(R., p. 239-40) ( emphasis added). The district court went on to hold that questions of fact existed 
regarding whether the parties reached an oral contract. (R., p. 245-48). 
After trial, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, however, the district court found 
that although the parties intended to formalize any subcontract agreement with a formal written 
subcontract, an express contract was created by the conduct of the parties, notwithstanding the 
parties' failure to execute the intended written contract. The district court stated: 
Kevin Bauer of EVCO and Mike Coulter and Jim Kuzmich of Cedar Street, all 
testified they intended to reduce their agreement to a signed written subcontract or 
a written purchase order, or a joint check agreement. All three were created, but none 
of the three were signed by both parties. Regardless, this Court finds the conduct of 
the parties shows a meeting of the minds occurred and a contract was formed in 
the amount of$132,688.04, less the Idaho Use Tax amount of$3,258.04, for a total 
contract price of$129,430.00. 
(R., p. 262) (bold italic emphasis added). 
Seaboard respectfully submits the district court applied an implied in fact contract analysis 
to establish an express contract, and thereby ignored long-standing Idaho contract law. The district 
court's decision runs directly contrary to this Court's decision in Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 
582 P.2d 1074 (1978), lntermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 
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233, 31 P.3d 921 (2001), and C.H Leavell v. Grafe & Assoc., Inc., 90 Idaho 502,414 P.2d 873 
(1966), and amounts to an error of law. The district court disregarded the evidence in order to 
conclude an express contract arose between EVCO and Cedar Street. 
With respect to the notice and timeliness of EV CO' s claims and action, Seaboard respectfully 
submits that the alleged "work" on which EVCO predicates its claimed timeliness is insufficient 
under Idaho Code § 54-1927. EVCO claims it performed its last work in April of 2005 (training 
school district personnel and fine-tuning the TV system), and in June of 2005 (sending as-built 
drawings). Seaboard respectfully submits these actions are insufficient to qualify as "work" under 
Idaho Code § 54-1927, thereby extending the dates to provide notice and file suit. This is 
particularly true based upon all parties' agreement, as well as documentary evidence, that the 
Timberlake Junior High School Project (the "Project") was substantially completed in January of 
2005. The Lakeland School District No. 272 ("School District") began operating the Project as a 
school on January 28, 2005. 
Finally, regarding EVCO' s claimed damages, this issue is directly related to the 
determination as to whether an express contract was formed between EVCO and Cedar Street. As 
set forth in EVCO's Exhibit 22, EVCO admits that it can only account for $51,108.63 worth oflabor 
and materials, freight and taxes EVCO supplied to the Project. This is true, notwithstanding the 
breakout of labor and materials far exceeding these amounts by EVCO's prior bid proposals 
designated as Exhibits 8 and 18. EVCO was paid an amount exceeding its costs as listed in Exhibit 
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22, however, EVCO seeks to recover its expectation damages of$79,3363.04 against a third party 
- Seaboard. 
B. Factual Background 
1. Parties / Interested Companies 
EVCO is a Washington corporation, principally located in Spokane, Washington. EVCO 
conducts business as a low-voltage electrical supply and installation company. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 5, l. 
6-25). 1 EVCO business is comprised of 80% public works projects, 60% of which are school 
projects such as the project at issue in this matter. In the year in question, 2005, EVCO's gross 
revenue was approximately 6.4 million dollars. (Tr. Vol. II, p. l 02, I. 4-17). 
Seaboard is a surety licensed to provide surety bonds in Idaho. (R., p. 2, 11, and 39). 
Cedar Street is an Idaho corporation, principally located in Sandpoint, Idaho. Cedar Street 
was an electrical contractor, licensed with the State ofldaho and maintained Idaho public works 
license No. 11613-A-4. (R., p. 2; Ex. 9; Tr. Vol. II, p. 61, I. 11-16)). Cedar Street was the electrical 
subcontract on the project in question. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 38, I. 6-24). 
Although not a party to the action, Ormond Builders, Inc. ("Ormond Builders") was the 
principal on the bond issued by Seaboard as Bond No. SS7377 (the "Bond"). (Ex. 1). Ormond 
Builders was the general contractor on the project at issue. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 195, I. 25 -p. 197, I. 9). 
1 The transcript is divided into two volumes as follows: Volume I-August 27, 2007 
(direct examination of Kevin Bauer only); and Volume II-August 27, 2007 (remainder of trial). 
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2. The Project 
The School District was the owner of the Project. Ormond Builders and Seaboard issued 
payment and performance bonds pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-1927. (Ex. 1). Ormond Builders 
subcontracted the entire electrical portion of the Project to Cedar Street in April of 2004, pursuant 
to a written Subcontract Agreement (Ex. M), which incorporated by reference the Project prime 
contract documents with the School District, which included the Prime Contract General and 
Supplementary Conditions. (Ex. M, p. 1). 
3. Negotiations Between EVCO and Cedar Street 
In or about March of 2004, EVCO prepared a bid form for portions of the electrical work on 
the Project, which was characterized by the parties as including "low voltage" electrical work for the 
amount of $165,850.00. (Ex. 4). Approximately one week after Exhibit 4 was prepared, and 
pursuant to discussions between EVCO and Cedar Street, EVCO revised its pricing on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4 to include Idaho sales or use tax at 6%. (Ex. 8). EVCO's revised bid identified a price of 
$170,161.00. (Ex. 8). 
From March through the end of June 2004, EVCO made several revisions and changes to its 
bids. (Exhibit 12 and 18). There was testimony from EVCO, Cedar Street and Ormond Builders 
that during this time period there was an effort to "value engineer" portions of the work to reduce 
the amount of work and save money for the owner because the Project was over budget. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 21, I. 11 - p. 22, l. 6; p. 39, 1. 6-20; p. 145, l. 13 - p. 146, I. 11). In June of 2004, Cedar Street 
and EVCO exchanged a number of facsimiles discussing the potential scope of an agreement 
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between EVCO and Cedar Street and the price to be paid for such work. (Ex. 14, 15, and F). Cedar 
Street wanted EVCO to be bound by the same agreement it had with Ormond Builders and used its 
subcontract with Ormond Builders to draft a subcontract for EVCO. Cedar Street went to the 
extraordinary step of scanning and changing its subcontract with Ormond Builders to prepare a 
written subcontract for EVCO should it reach an agreement with EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, l. 17 -
p. 44, l. 25). From the documents exchanged between Cedar Street and EVCO, however, the parties 
never reached an agreement as to the scope of work which EVCO might perform on the Project or 
the amount EVCO would be paid by Cedar Street. (Ex. 15 and Ex. F). 
Both James Kuzmich and Mike Coulter of Cedar Street testified that Cedar Street sought to 
self-perform more of the low-voltage work in order to reduce the amount of any potential subcontract 
with EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46, I. 7-13; p. 77, I. 10 ~ p. 78, I. 6). Moreover, both Mr. Kuzmich and 
Mr. Coulter testified that Cedar Street never reached an agreement with EV CO regarding the scope 
of work the parties would perform or the price to be paid for the Project. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 45, I. 4 - p. 
46, I. 2; p. 55, I. 5 - p. 56, I. I; p. 76, I. 6 - p. 78, I. 25). 
4. The Parties' Testimony Regarding the Intention to Execute a Written Subcontract or 
Written Purchase Order 
Both EVCO (Kevin Bauer) and Cedar Street (Mike Coulter and Jim Kuzmich) testified 
regarding their respective intentions to reduce any agreement to a signed written subcontract or 
written purchase order.2 (Tr. Vol. II, p. 20, !. 15 -p. 21, I. 2; p. 45, I. 20- p. 46, I. 3; p. 63, I. 17 -p. 
2 Mr. Bauer's testimony is confusing at best regarding receipt of Cedar Street's proposed 
subcontract, and bears review by the Court. (See also Bauer deposition p. 25, I. l O - p. 26, I. 9). 
Ultimately, however, he conceded he too anticipated a written contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 20, l. 15 -
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65, I. 16). Mike Coulter testified that he understood that if an agreement were reached between 
EVCO and Cedar Street, such agreement would be reduced to a written subcontract or written 
purchase order executed between the two companies. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 45, I. 20 - p. 46, I. 3). 
On June 14, 2004, Cedar Street's project manager, Mr. Coulter sent a facsimile (Ex. 14) to 
EVCO indicating that Cedar Street "intended" to enter into a contract with EVCO and that a 
proposed subcontract would be sent. Mr. Coulter also requested that EVCO supply "back cans" to 
the Project. (Ex. I 4). On June 22, 2004, Mr. Coulter sent a facsimile to EVCO (Ex. 15 and Ex. F), 
attaching a proposed subcontract, requesting EVCO's review of the same. Mr. Coulter testified that 
he left blank the scope of work and price in the subcontract because the parties had not reached an 
agreement. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 45, I. 4-9). Mr. Coulter testified that there was never an agreement 
between Cedar Street and EVCO as to the scope of work EVCO would perform or the price it would 
be paid. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 55, I. 5 - p. 56, I. l ). 
Mr. Kuzmich, the owner of Cedar Street, also testified that it was always his intention to 
enter into a written subcontract with EVCO, if the parties could reach an agreement as to the scope 
of work EVCO would perform and the price it would be paid on the Project. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 78, I. 
22-25). Mr. Kuzmich testified that it was standard practice for Cedar Street to use signed agreements 
on subcontracts of the magnitude of the proposal from EVCO. Mr. Kuzmich testified that Cedar 
Street had previously used form subcontracts from other general contractors, to subcontract work and 
bind lower tier subcontractors to Cedar Street. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 63, I. 17 - p. 65, I. 19). 
p. 21, I. 2). 
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After rather extensive cross examination on the issue, Mr. Bauer also agreed that as the 
owner of EV CO, he anticipated that EVCO and Cedar Street would execute a written subcontract 
or written purchase order if the parties could reach an agreement regarding the scope of work to be 
performed by the parties and the price to be paid to EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 20, 1. 15 - p. 21, I. 2). 
Additionally, the Project Specifications at general condition 5.3. l require Ormond Builders 
to use contracts to subcontract work, where required by Idaho law to be valid and binding. (Ex. N, 
p. 23). The subcontract between Ormond Builders and Cedar Street incorporated the general 
conditions into that subcontract, such that Cedar Street was bound to only subcontract work pursuant 
to a written agreement. (Ex. M). Mr. Bauer admitted that no one on behalf of Cedar Street or 
Ormond Builders ever signed any document agreeing to any ofEVCO's bids, Exhibits 4, 8, 12, or 
18. (Tr. Vol. II, p. I 0, I. 4-10). 
5. The Joint Check Agreement 
On or about June 23, 2004, Cedar Street sent an unsigned joint check agreement to EVCO. 
(Ex. 16). The proposed joint check agreement listed an incorrect corporate name for EVCO, and 
listed a proposed amount for materials, which differed from any of the amounts previously discussed 
between EVCO and Cedar Street. The proposed joint check agreement lists EVCO as only a 
material supplier (not a subcontractor) in three different places. (Ex. 16). Mr. Bauer signed the joint 
check agreement on behalf of EV CO. (Ex. 16). No one from Cedar Street ever signed the proposed 
joint check agreement, nor did Ormond Builders ever sign the proposed joint check agreement. (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 65, I. 22-25; p. 127, I. 17 - p. 132, I. 5; Ex. 16). 
8 
Mr. Hostert of Ormond Builders testified that Mr. Kuzmich of Cedar Street advised him that 
Cedar Street was declining to execute the proposed joint check agreement, because it was "no longer 
necessary" and Cedar Street anticipated performing more of the low-voltage electrical work, rather 
than subcontracting with EVCO to perform that work. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 129, I. 17 - p. 132, I. 5). 
On behalf of Ormond Builders, Mr. Ormond testified concerning the difference between a 
"notice ofintent" to contract and a "notice to proceed". Mr. Ormond testified that in the construction 
industry, a notice of intent to contract is used when parties have not yet reached an agreement as to 
the price, scope of work or terms of a contract. It is used to identify the potential that parties may 
contract, but does not create the contract between them. Mr. Ormond testified that "notice to 
proceed" is used in the construction industry once a contract is reached by the parties and "notice to 
proceed" directs that work commence under the terms of the contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 191, I. 7 - p. 
193, I. 20). 
6. Materials and Labor Supplied By EVCO to the Project 
Despite the lack of an executed written subcontract or purchase order between Cedar Street 
and EVCO, EVCO did provide materials and minimal labor to the Project, which is detailed and 
listed in Exhibit 22. (Ex. 22). Pursuant to Exhibit 22, EVCO provided $45,393.16 in materials to 
the Project. Mr. Bauer was unable to identify any materials supplied to the Project, which were not 
included in the materials listed in Exhibit 22. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25, I. 24 - p. 26, I. 2). 
EVCO tracked its field labor on the Project, and listed its technician for field labor in Exhibit 
22 in the amount of$4,454.27. Although EVCO purports to have incurred additional "labor" costs 
9 
in the amount ofits claim ($79,343.03) it did not and pursuant to Mr. Bauer's testimony EVCO can 
nottrack such labor to substantiate its claimed damages. Mr. Bauer could not testify with any degree 
of specificity as to labor supplied to the Project, other than as detailed in Exhibit 22. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
27, I. l l-24). Thus, the only valid evidence before the court as to EVCO's expenses was that 
contained in Exhibit 22. 
Mr. Bauer also testified that EVCO sent its billings directly to Cedar Street. EVCO's last 
billing invoice is Invoice No. 6710 in the amount of$8,350.00. That billing invoice as submitted 
in EVCO's claim to Seaboard was dated February 11, 2005, as identified in Exhibit 2, attachment 
b, bates label 298. However, the same billing invoice number and amount appears to have been 
changed in Exhibit 20, to reflect a later billing date of March 22, 2005. Incidentally, the first copy 
of this billing invoice, dated February 11, 2005, bears a facsimile legend at the top which predates 
the copy of the invoice provided in Exhibit 20, dated March 22, 2005. Mr. Bauer testified that 
EVCO bills for work only after it has been completed, in the form of a progress billing identifying 
the percentage completed as of the date of the invoice. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 24, I. 3 - p. 25, i. 1). 
Further, as to the issue of mark-ups, although Mr. Bauer testified on direct examination in 
EVCO's case in chief regarding mark-up rates it expects to earn on work such as the Project, Mr. 
Bauer later admitted Cedar Street never agreed to any mark-up rate or amount. He also admitted no 
one at Ormond Builders agreed to a mark-up rate or amount. Finally, he admitted that he did not and 
does not discuss EVCO's mark-up amount or rates with contractors. There was no evidence 
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presented of any agreement between EVCO and Cedar Street regarding the amount of a "mark-up" 
for EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. I 17, l. 22-p. 118, !. 8). 
7. EVCO's Reguest for Additional Payment 
At or near the date of substantial completion of the Project, Mr. Bauer contacted Mr. Hostert 
to inform him that Cedar Street owed payment to EVCO on the Project. Mr. Hostert testified that 
he requested that Mr. Bauer forward a copy of the subcontract between EVCO and Cedar Street to 
substantiate EVCO's claims. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 134, I. 4 - p. 135, I. 5). Mr. Hostert testified he never 
received a response from Mr. Bauer regarding the subcontract, however, some time in March of 
2005, Mr. Bauer again contacted Mr. Hostert to request payment. Thereafter, Mr. Bauer forwarded 
a copy of Exhibit 18 to Mr. Hostert, which Mr. Hostert understood to be a bid proposal. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 135, l. 6 • p. 136, I. 11). 
Both Mr. Ormond and Mr. Hostert testified regarding the payments made to EVCO. Mr. 
Hostert testified Ormond Builders observed work performed and materials supplied by EVCO to the 
Project, and based upon past project experience, determined that a paymentof$50,000.00, combined 
with the previous payment of $3,325.00 would cover the amount oflabor and materials supplied by 
EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 137, I. 21 - p. 140, p. 19; p. 205, I. 1 - p. 207, I. 1). Pursuant to Exhibit 24 
and the testimony of Mr. Bauer, Mr. Hostert and Mr. Ormond, EVCO was paid $53,325.00 on the 
Project. This amount exceeds EVCO's tracked labor and material costs on the Project as detailed 
in Exhibit 22, by $2,216.37. (Ex. 22). 
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8. Completion of the Project 
The School District took beneficial occupancy of the Project on January 28, 2005, and 
utilized the Project for its intended purpose as a school from that date forward. Mr. Hostert, Ormond 
Builders' project manager, testified that subsequent to January 28, 2005, the only Project work 
performed by Ormond Builders or its subcontractors was either punchlist and warranty work or 
original contract work such as landscaping that could not be performed until weather permitted. 
Both the architect, Mr. Fischer, and Mr. Hostert testified that owners such as the School District 
typically withhold payment from a general contractor, until all punchlist and warranty work is 
completed. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 174, I. 5-21; p. 227, L 11-25; p. 232, I. 5-10). Mr. Fischer testified that 
as of the date of substantial completion, all of the low-voltage systems within the building on the 
Project were completed and operational. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 231, L 9-24; Ex. Q; Ex. 25). Mr. Fisher 
certified each of the systems on which EVCO provided material or labor as 100% complete pursuant 
to Ormond Builders' February 17, 2005, pay request. (Ex. Q, 25). 
9. EVCO's Bond Claim 
On June 13, 2005, Ormond Builders received a Notice of Claim by EVCO through its 
counsel asserting that it was entitled to $79,343.03 pursuant to Idaho Code§ 54-1927. EVCO's 
Notice was dated June 8, 2005. (Ex. 2). Thereafter, on September 29, 2005, EVCO provided Notice 
to Seaboard of its claim, attaching its prior notice to Ormond Builders. (Ex. 2). EVCO claims that 
training it provided on April 15, 2005, makes its claim on the bond timely under the Idaho Public 
Contract Bond Act. EVCO also asserted that it submitted "as-built drawings" in June of2005, which 
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also made its bond claim timely, however, there was no documentary evidence at trial regarding 
EVCO's submission of any as-built drawings. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 45, I. 9-15). 
C. Procedural History 
EVCO filed its Complaint against Cedar Street and Seaboard on March l 0, 2006. (R., p. 2-
5). EVCO exclusively pied in its Complaint that it had a written contract with Cedar Street. (R., 
p. 3). There were no allegations of an implied or express contract. Seaboard filed its Answer on 
May 4, 2006. (R., p. 10-14). Cedar Street never answered the Complaint. After being found in 
default, Cedar Street's Motion to Set Aside Default was denied. (R., p. 274). 
Seaboard filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 16, 2007, which it argued that 
EVCO's claims were barred by the statute oflimitations and that there was no expressed contract 
right ofrecovery. Seaboard asserted its arguments based on the very same evidence submitted at 
trial. (R., p. 36-61 ). ln its summary judgment ruling, the district court correctly found that there was 
no "formal express contract," which was contrary to EVCO's verified Complaint. (R., p. 239-40, 
245). The district court specifically stated: "Undisputed facts reveal there was never an express 
contract between EVCO and Cedar Street".3 The district court also ruled that genuine issues of 
material fact existed regarding the statute of limitations and notice and whether Cedar Street and 
EVCO reached an oral agreement. However, after a two-day trial, and an examination of exactly the 
same documentary evidence, the district court ruled that the parties had an express contract based 
upon the conduct of the parties, notwithstanding the stated intention of both parties to execute a 
3 The district court repeatedly used the term "formal express contract" presumably to 
mean a written contract. 
13 
written agreement. The district court also deemed EVCO's notice and action against the bond to be 
timely, and concluded that its alleged oral express agreement was not barred by the statute of frauds. 
(R., p. 236-52). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review on appeal: 
(1) Whether the district court erred by as a matter oflaw in holding that an express contract 
was established between EVCO and Cedar Street. 
(2) Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in awarding EVCO's alleged 
expectation damages against Seaboard's bond. 
(3) Whether the district court erred in determining EVCO's Notice and Claim were timely, 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 54-1927. 
(4) Whether the district court erred in determining that EVCO's claims were not barred as 
against Seaboard based upon the statute of frauds. 
HI. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
Idaho Code § 54-1929 authorizes a prevailing party attorneys fee award at the trial court 
level. However, Idaho appellate courts have held attorneys fees are not properly awarded under I.C. 
§ 54-1929 on appeal. See LeGrand Steel Prods., Co. v. A.S.C. Constructors, Inc., 108 Idaho 817, 
819, 702 P.2d 855,857 (Ct. App. 1985); (fees on appeal denied to prevailing subcontractor); EIMCO 
Div. of Envirotech Corp. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762, 765, 710 P.2d 672,675 (Ct. App. 
1985) (fees on appeal denied to prevailing surety). Attorneys fees on appeal in this matter would be 
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governed by Idaho Code§ 12-121. See O/dcastle Precast v. ParkTowne Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 376, 
379, 128 P.3d 913 (2005) (implicitly finding prevailing party fees on a bond claim action only 
available under Idaho Code § 12-121 - fees denied to prevailing surety under Idaho Code § 54-
1929). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Holding that its Findings of Fact 
Demonstrated an Express Contract Between EVCO and Cedar Street. 
"[T]he court cannot make a contract for the parties." Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 175, 
174 P.2d 202, 205 (1946). The district court, ignoring Jong-standing principles of contract law, 
found an express contract, where there is no evidence of acceptance by Cedar Street of the price or 
scope of work proposed by EVCO. In fact, Cedar Street notified EVCO that it expected the parties 
to enter into a written contract and provided a proposed subcontract, the terms of which differed 
from EVCO's proposals. In its decision, the district court misapplied the legal requirements of 
contract formation and confused concepts of implied contracts and express contracts. The general 
contractor and owner insisted on written subcontracts on the Project, including any agreement 
between EVCO and Cedar Street, to protect themselves from the very type of claim asserted by 
EVCO. To allow EVCO to obtain benefits of any of its unaccepted proposed bids as against 
Seaboard would be fundamentally unfair. EVCO's documentation of its work does not support its 
claimed expectation damages. Moreover, EV CO could have insisted on a written contract or tracked 
its purported labor and materials to support its alleged damage claim. Instead, it seeks to impose its 
alleged expectation damages on an innocent third-party, Seaboard. 
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The district court's application of contract Jaw to the facts of this case is a conclusion oflaw 
over which the Supreme Court exercises free review. See Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 
Idaho 827,831, 103 P.3d 440,444 (2004). 
1. No Express Contract was Formed Because the Parties Proposed Different Terms and No 
Acceptance of Either Party's Proposals Occurred. 
The conflicting terms proposed by the parties' prohibited a meeting of the minds and the 
creation of an express agreement. Three types of contractual arrangements are recognized under 
Idaho law: 
First is the express contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a 
transaction. Secondly, there is the implied in fact contract wherein there is no 
express agreement but the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which 
an obligation in contract exists. The third category is called an implied in law 
contract, or quasi contract. However, a contract implied in law is not a contract at 
all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and 
equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties and, in some 
cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties. It is a non-contractual obligation 
that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a contract, and is often referred to as 
quasi contract, unjust enrichment, implied in law contract or restitution. 
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,767,979 P.2d 627,640 (1999) 
(citing Continental Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739,518 P.2d 1201 (1974) 
( emphasis added)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has identified the requirements for acceptance of 
an express contract stating: "An enforceable contract requires 'distinct understanding common to 
both parties.' Acceptance of an offer must be unequivocal and identical to the offer made. 'The 
minds of the parties must meet as to all the terms before a contract is formed.' Proof of a meeting 
of the minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of the agreement and the 
16 
assent of both parties." Potts Cqnst. Co. v. North Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678,681, 116 
P.3d 8, 11 (2005) (internal citations omitted). This Court has frequently detailed the requirements 
of mutual assent necessary to support contract formation: 
The minds of the parties must meet as to all of its terms, and, if any portion of the 
proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract. An offer to 
enter into a contractual relation must be so complete that upon acceptance an 
agreement is formed which contains all of the terms necessary to determine whether 
the contract has been performed or not. An acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, 
must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce 
any new terms into the offer. An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer 
is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must in turn be accepted 
by the offerer in order to constitute a binding contract. 
C.H Leavell v. Grafe &Assoc., Inc., 90 Idaho 502,511,414 P.2d 873, 877 (1966) (internal citations 
omitted). Contrary to the legal conclusions of the court, the evidence failed to support a meeting of 
the minds which is a necessary prerequisite to finding an express contract. 
Further, the district court confused elements of an implied in fact contract with an express 
contract. In Fox v. Mountain West Electric, Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 59 P.3d 878 (2002), the Idaho 
Supreme Court discussed the elements of implied in fact contracts, and stated: 
"An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the 
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and 
the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending 
the performance." Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283,287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 
(1994) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). 
The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit 
understanding. Kennedyv. Forest, 129 Idaho 584,587,930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). 
"The general rule is that where the conduct of the pa...rties allows the dual inferences 
that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party promised 
payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. 
v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319,321,715 P12d 989,991 (1986) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 
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90 Idaho 143,153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965); Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324,325, 
563 P.2d 48, 49 (1977)). 
Mountain West Electric, Inc., 52 P.3d at 853. Consequently, the conduct of the parties may have 
demonstrated an implied contract, but not an express contract. 
No meeting of the minds to support an express contract occurred in this case because the 
parties' proposals and counter proposals were never in agreement, no common understanding was 
ever reached. The district court's error in holding an express contract existed is best illustrated by 
reviewing the undisputed chronology of the parties' offers and counteroffers, facts and documents: 
Date Party Item Proposal 
March 3, 2004 EVCO EVCObid $165,850.00 
(Ex. 1) proposal No details regarding the scope of work 
March 10, 2004 EVCO EVCO revised $147,500 + $18,350 + taxes 
(Ex. 8) bid Details regarding the scope of work 
. 
March 15, 2004 EVCO EVCO second $34,930.00 purportedly deducted from prior 
(Ex. E; Ex. 12) revised bid bid 
proposal No price or scope of work included 
. 
June 14, 2004 Cedar Cedar Street fax "Please accept this fax as our intent to enter 
(Ex. 14) Street into contract with EVCO for this project 
(Contract to follow). We need back cans 
for wall mount clock & speakers. ASAP" 
June 22, 2004 Cedar Cedar Street fax "[I)n order for us to be on the same page, 
(Ex. G) Street the following [ engineering] items have been 
accepted. Could you please provide me 
with your amount again . ... Also, please 
review subcontract." 
June 22, 2004 Cedar Draft Contract is blank as to scope and amount, 
(Ex. F.) Street subcontract and proposes substantial new additional 
terms 
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June 23, 2004 Cedar Proposed joint Proposed amount not to exceed $130,000.00 
(Ex. G) Street check for materials 
agreement 
June 28, 2004 EVCO EVCO Cedar Street does not execute joint check 
(Ex. G) executed joint agreement with EVCO4 
check Ormond Builders does not execute joint 
agreement party check agreement 
June 29, 2004 EVCO EVCOthird Alternative bids at $165,850.00, 
(Ex. B) revised bid $! 70,161.00, or $132,688.04 
In addition to the above-listed offers and counter offers, Cedar Street witnesses also testified 
there was never an agreement with EVCO regarding the scope or price. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 55, l. 5 - p. 
56, I. 15; p. 76, I. 6 - p. 78, I. 256). In fact, Cedar Street intended to 
4 Cedar Street did execute at least two other joint party check agreements with other 
parties. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 127, l. l3 - p. 128, l. 4). 
5 Mr. Coulter: · 
Q. But as I understood your testimony on direct examination, as of the date of 
June 19th you didn't have an understanding or agreement as to the scope of 
work that it would do if you reached an agreement, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Or a price between EVCO and Cedar Street, correct? 
A. That's correct. Final -- go ahead. 
Q. No, excuse me. 
A. I would've said that I wouldn't make the final decision anyway. That 
would've been up to Mr. Kuzmich. 
Q. And that's the reason Exhibit Fis blank as to the scope of work and the 
price, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
6 Mr. Kuzmich: 
Q. Mr. Kuzmich, could you turn your attention to Exhibit 14? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you might recall counsel directed your attention to the last sentence. 
It says, "We need back cans for wall mount clock and speakers ASAP." Do 
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you recall that? 
A. I recall he asked me that, yes, sir. 
Q. And counsel said, "And it means just what it says, right?" Do you recall 
that phrase? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you understand this to be an agreement to the scope of work or price 
previously proposed by Evco for all of the work on the project? 
A. Oh, no, sir. 
Q. Do you ever remember reaching an agreement as to the scope of work 
proposed by Evco on the Timberlake project? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How about the price? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Turning your attention to Exhibit 18, do you see the amounts listed for 
material and equipment in the sections? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall having any discussions or attempting to discuss with Evco a 
break-out, a further break-out of those numbers? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. (By Mr. Hahn) Are you familiar with the low voltage work that is being 
proposed in Exhibit 18? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And based on your experience, do you have a feeling as to whether the 
amounts are reasonable or unreasonable, high or low? 
A. l felt they were a little high. 
Q. Did you in your own mind think that perhaps Cedar Street could do some 
of this work? 
A. I felt that our labor could do this cheaper than what was listed here. 
Q. In fact, do you recall discussing that with people at Ormond Builders, that 
Cedar Street would perhaps undertake portions of this work? 
A. I don't recall ifI personally had that conversation. 
Q. Did you )Jave those same types of conversations or that type of 
conversation with Mr. Coulter? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And tell me what you recall. 
A. I spoke with Mike about, uh, getting some numbers broken out here to see 
where we might be able to save some dollars on this contract, either via us 
purchasing some of the material ourselves at a cheaper rate or having some of 
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self-perform some of the work initially proposed by EVCO because it believed EVCO's labor price 
was too high. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 46, I. 7-13; p. 77, I. 10 -p. 78, I. 6). Further, Cedar Street testified that 
it expected to enter into a written contract so that EVCO would be bound to the same terms as Cedar 
Street was bound to Ormond Builders. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, I. 17 - p. 44, I. 25; Ex. M). Even Mr. 
Bauer could not "recall" whether or not Cedar Street accepted any of EVCO's bid proposals, but 
claimed Exhibit 14, (the request for back cans), was a direction for EVCO to start work on the 
Project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, l. 1-5). This does not amount to a meeting of the minds. 
In considering the above-listed offers, counteroffers and changed terms, the district court 
created an express contract between Cedar Street and EVCO when the closest the parties ever came 
to an express agreement was a future "intent" to enter into a contract if the parties could agree on the 
scope of work and price. "Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence of mutual 
understanding as to the terms of the agreement and the assent of both parties." Potts Const. Co. v. 
North Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678,681, 1 l 6 P.3d 8, 11 (2005). At best, the parties conduct 
established an implied in fact contract as to only a very small portion of the work. No express 
agreement ever arose. This is particularly true if Cedar Street's proposed subcontract terms are 
reviewed. (Ex.F). The district court erred as a matter oflaw in concluding the legal requirements 
our apprentices do the work at a lesser rate. That's pretty much my 
involvement with it. 
Q. Mr. Kuzmich, was it always your intention, if you were to reach an 
agreement with Evco, to enter into a written purchase order or subcontract? 
A. Yes, it was. 
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for an express contract, a meeting of the minds (i.e., distinct understanding common to both parties) 
were met. 
Although the district court recognized that the parties never entered into a "formal express 
contract," it created an express contract by incorporating the scope of work that was memorialized 
in Exhibit 8 on March 10, 2004, and a price memorialized in Exhibit 18 on June 29, 2004. The 
court, however, ignored any of the additional terms proposed by Cedar Street in what the court 
viewed as its acceptance ifEVCO's terms in its response in Exhibit 14 on June 14, 2004. (R., p. 
246). The district court's holding regarding Cedar Street's legally binding acceptance consisted of 
only the following: 
Please accept this fax as our intent to enter into contract with EVCO for this 
project. (Contract to follow) 
We need back cans for wall mount clock & speakers. ASAP 
(R. p. 242; Ex. 14) ( emphasis added). The district court ignored long-standing Idaho law concerning 
contract acceptance: "An acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and 
unconditional, and must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer. An acceptance which 
varies from the terms of the offer is a rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must 
in turn be accepted by the offerer in order to constitute a binding contract." C.H Leavell v. Grafe 
& Assoc., Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 511, 414 P.2d 873, 877 (1966) (internal citations omitted). 
Clearly, Cedar Street's purported acceptance did not mirror EVCO' s proposed bid in Exhibit 
8 or any of its other offers. Exhibit 14 neither expresses an agreement as to the price or to the scope 
of work, or unequivocal acceptance of any of EVCO's prior bids. Cedar Street attached its formal 
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subcontract that proposed numerous additional terms. The district court completely failed to 
acknowledge the additional terms in Cedar Street's subcontract. In fact, the district court's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law cite Exhibit F only once. (R., p. 240). Interestingly, Seaboard 
submitted the only copy of the subcontract because EVCO failed to include a complete copy of the 
facsimile, which is Exhibit 15. (R. p. 236-53). 
The district court confused preliminary negotiations with an offer and proper acceptance. 
This Court previously explained the difference: 
[a] manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to 
whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not 
intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent. 
IntermountainForest Managementv. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233,237, 31 P.3d 921,925 
(200 l) ( quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts § 26). Cedar Street indicated it intended to contract 
with EVCO, but requested that EVCO enter into a written contract. (Ex. 14, F). Cedar Street later 
requested that EVCO review the subcontract. (Ex. 6). Cedar Street never accepted any ofEVCO's 
proposals and EVCO never accepted Cedar Street's proposals. The parties engaged in nothing more 
than preliminary negotiations that failed to conclude with an express contract formation, except 
perhaps as to the purchase of"back cans." (Ex. 14). 
The district court could only reach its decision by misapplying very limited case law where 
an express agreement was found even though the parties agreed to enter into a written agreement. 
See Barryv. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d440 (2004); but see C.H Leavell & 
Co. v. Grafe & Assoc., 90 Idaho 502, 512, 414 P .2d 873, 877 (1966). Although factually distinct, 
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the analysis of Barry is illustrative. In Barry, the contractor, Pac-West, advertised for bids on two 
specification sections of its general contract, Sections 09260 and 09511. See Barry, 140 Idaho at 
830, 103 P.3d at 443. Quality, the subcontractor, submitted a bid for the work. See id. Pac-West 
contacted Quality and offered it the job "it had bid." Id. Pac-West claimed it believed an additional 
specification, Section 09111, was included in Quality's bid, and sent Quality a proposed subcontract 
with the additional section included. See id There was, however, obvious agreement only as to the 
original specification sections. Quality signed the contract, but did not return it to Pac-West and 
refused to perform the work associated with the additional section. See id. 
The trial court found that the parties were bound by the preliminary agreement, i.e., Pac-
West's verbal acceptance of Quality's bid, as follows: 
Id. 
A formal written contract was contemplated between the parties, but the fact that one 
was not executed is not fatal to the agreement The district court held that Quality 
and Pac-West were bound by the preliminary agreement, relying on the principle 
articulated in Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, that where 'the parties act under the 
preliminary agreement or receive benefits thereunder, they will be held to be bound 
notwithstanding the fact that a formal contract has never been executed. The 
preliminary agreement consisted of Quality's bid on Sections 09260 and 09511 and 
Pac-West's acceptance of that offer by offering Quality the job "it had bid." The 
parties acted pursuant to that agreement. 
In this case, the district court found the parties "all testified they intended to reduce their 
agreement to a signed written subcontract or a written purchase order, or a joint check agreement. 
All three were created, but none of the three were signed by the parties." (R. p. 262, ,r 17). This case 
is factually distinct from Barry in that here, unlike in Barry, there was never any initial agreement 
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as to the terms and conditions. What is required under Barry, for an express contract to be created, 
is a preliminary agreement pursuant to which the parties acted. Contrary to Barry, however, there 
is absolutely no evidence of a preliminary agreement here. No evidence shows that Cedar Street ever 
"accepted" EVCO's bid orally or in writing. In fact, Cedar Street indicated it ultimately refused to 
execute the joint party check agreement because it had not reached an agreement with EVCO as to 
the scope of the work and Cedar Street intended to self-perform a larger portion of the proposed 
work. Cedar Street informed the general contractor of the failure to reach an agreement with EVCO. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 128, I. 19 - p. 131, I. 21). Further, Cedar Street provided its own proposal and sent 
EVCO additional terms in its subcontract. Cedar Street's actions are legally insufficient for mutual 
assent and contract formation. Cedar Street's only commitment directed to EVCO was an intent to 
enter into a written contract in the future, i.e., preliminary negotiations and a request for EVCO to 
provide back cans which is legally insufficient to form an express contract. (Ex. l 4 ). At best, EVCO 
and Cedar Street had an express agreement only for EVCO to provide the back cans for the Project. 
Moreover, if Cedar Street had accepted EVCO's offer by its words on June 14, 2008, in Exhibit 14, 
it makes no sense that it would leave both the price and scope of work blank in the proposed 
subcontract sent to EVCO on June 22, 2008, Exhibit F. 
Further, Cedar Street's subcontract proposed substantially different terms, which the district 
court failed to acknowledge. Cedar Street expected EVCO to be bound by the same terms Cedar 
Street had with Ormond Builders. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, I. 17 -p. 44, I. 25; Ex. M). The district court 
dismissed the proposed subcontract as a "form contract" (R., p. 240), but Cedar Street provided 
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uncontested testimony that it rejected any form contracts it reviewed and specifically chose to copy 
Ormond Builders' contract as its contract with EVCO. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, I. 17 - p. 44, I. 25; Ex. F). 
Moreover, Cedar Street, in its proposed agreement provided to EVCO on June 22, 2004, proposed 
payment requirements; changes, additions, and deductions limitations; timeliness and delay damages; 
indemnity provisions, workers compensation requirements, bonding requirements, insurance 
coverages, etc. (Ex. F., p. 2-5). These additional terms were never accepted by EVCO and were 
essential elements to Cedar Street's willingness to contract with EVCO. See C. H Leavell & Co. 
v. Grafe &Assocs., Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 51 l, 414 P.2d 873, 876-77 (l 966) (finding no meeting of the 
minds as to scope of work and requirement to furnish a performance bond). The district court 
ignored the terms of the proposed subcontract. 
Adhering to the fundamental principles of contract formation is especially critical in this case 
because the Court is requiring an innocent third-party not privy to the full negotiations and 
discussions, Seaboard, to pay the costs of the alleged express contract. The district court has saddled 
Seaboard with EVCO's claimed, yet improved expectation damages. Clearly, the district court's 
determination opens the door for abuse and manipulation by subcontractors and suppliers. 
The district court erred because the facts were legally insufficient to support mutual assent 
and a meeting of the minds. Cedar Street's notice of its intent to contract with EVCO by written 
agreement is not sufficient to form an express contract. 
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2. No Express Contract was Formed Because Cedar Street Intended a Written Contract 
to Finalize any Agreement. 
The district court erred in holding a legally enforceable express agreement existed because 
Cedar Street consistently indicated its intent to finalize any agreement in an executed writing. 
"Whether a contract exists when contracting parties agree to reduce their agreement to writing, is 
question of the parties' intent .... Where it is clear that one party has agreed that an oral agreement 
must be reduced to writing before it shall be binding, there is no contract until a formal document 
is executed." Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187,188,697 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Ct. App. 
1985) (citing Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,400,582 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978)). "The parties' 
intent determines whether an oral contract was formed when the parties agree to reduce their 
agreement to a writing. An oral agreement is valid if the written draft is viewed by the parties as a 
mere record; the oral agreement is not valid if the parties view the written draft as a consummation 
of the negotiation." Thompson v. Pike, 122 ldaho 690, 697, 838 P.2d 293, 300 (1992). Several 
factors are considered if there is a question as to the parties' intent regarding a written contract, such 
as: "(!) whether the contract is one usually put in writing, (2) whether there are few or many details, 
(3) whether the amount involved is large or small, (4) whether it requires a formal writing for a full 
expression of the covenants and promises, and (5) whether the negotiations indicate that a written 
draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of negotiations." Id. EVCO bore the burden of proof 
at trial to show the contract was binding, in spite of the failure to consummate the written agreement. 
See id. Seaboard submits that EVCO failed to meet this burden. 
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This case is similar to the case of lntermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana 
Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 31 P.3d 921 (2001) in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that no 
valid express contract existed based upon the parties' failure to both sign a proposed written 
subcontract agreement.7 In lntermountain, the defendant Louisiana Pacific Corp ("L-P") had a 
written contract with SMF Resources to log a section of land. Prior to completion, SMF ceased 
working based upon financial difficulties and one of its employees, Gary Briggs, who also was the 
President of the plaintiff corporation ("IFM") offered to continue the contract work. L-P's forester, 
Laurie Stone, met with Briggs and ultimately provided him with a proposed written subcontract 
agreement for IFM to undertake the work. Briggs executed the proposed subcontract and gave it to 
Stone to be executed by L-P. Briggs also began performance by forwarding certificates of proof of 
insurance, and also purchased equipment to begin the work. IFM claimed to have performed some 
of the logging work. 
Ultimately, no one at L-P ever signed the proposed subcontract, and L-P did not allow IFM 
to proceed with the work. IFM filed suit alleging breach of contract, and L-P filed a motion for 
summary judgment arguing that no express contract was ever established based upon a lack of 
mutual assent. IFM asserted that based upon L-P actions in forwarding a proposed subcontract, 
which was signed by IFM who commenced performance, an expressed contract was established. 
7 This case is even less compelling than the plaintiffs claims in lntermountain Forest 
Management. There, the plaintiff produced evidence that at least one party had signed the 
proposed contract prior to commencing performance. 
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IFM argued that by forwarding the proposed written contract L-P had made an "offer" which 
was "accepted" upon signing by IFM. The Court disagreed. On cross motions for summary 
judgment, the court held that based upon the failure of both parties to execute the proposed 
subcontract, no express contract was formed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the 
summary judgment stating: 
It is uncontroverted that no representative of L-P ever executed the contract; 
therefore, even drawing all inferences in favor ofIFM, there are no genuine issues 
of material fact in dispute regarding the lack of execution of a formal contract and the 
district judge did not err in granting L-P summary judgment on this issue. 
Intermountain, 136 Idaho at 236. 
After affirming the summary judgment in favor of L-P. the Supreme Court continued at 
length regarding IFM's theory of "offer" and "acceptance" as effectuating a contract. The Court 
stated: 
IFM further argues the mere absence of a signature did not prevent contract 
formation, citing Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67, 625 P.2d 
417,418 (1981). However, even if the lack of a signature does not necessarily 
prevent contract formation, IFM still must show a contract was formed through 
mutual assent. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 696, 838 P.2d 293, 299 (1992). 
A distinct understanding common to both parties is necessary in order for a 
contract to exist. Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 400, 582 P.2d 1074, 1078 
(1978)(citing Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 174 P.2d 202 (1946)). Whether a 
contract exists when contracting parties agree to reduce their agreement to writing, 
is a question of the parties' intent. Id. See also, Thompson, 122 Idaho at 696, 838 
P.2d at 299. 
Intermountain, 136 Idaho at 237 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, the Court held that because of the undisputed facts regarding L-P's failure to sign 
the contract, there was no express contract. The Court stated: 
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The district judge was correct in inferring from the undisputed facts that the written 
contract was to be the consummation of the negotiation between the parties and that 
the signed contract would govern their relationship. Because L-P did not sign the 
document, and the district judge could reasonably infer L-P did not intend to be 
bound until the document was signed, the district judge did not err in concluding that 
the parties lacked mutual assent to be bound. 
lntermountain, 136 Idaho at 238. 
A review of the undisputed facts reveal that there was never any expressed contract between 
EVCO and Cedar Street. Rather, there were a series of negotiations preliminary to a written contract 
and, although the parties looked to enter into a written contract, it was never consummated by either 
party. EVCO prepared and submitted a number of bid proposals and Cedar Street submitted a blank 
subcontract, which was never signed by either party. (Ex. F). Similar to lntermountain, Cedar 
Street's owner testified it was always his intent to consummate any agreement with a formal written 
contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, I. 2-7; p. 78, I. 22-25). Pursuant to its Proof of Claim to Seaboard, 
EVCO recognized there was never a "written" contract per se. Rather, there was a series .of 
documents, which EVCO argues creates a "written" contract. (Ex. 2). 
Although the district court acknowledged the above-referenced factors, it ignored the 
undisputed evidence. There is no dispute that both Cedar Street and EVCO intended to set forth 
their agreement by a signed written document to finalize their negotiations. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 12, I. 21 -
p. 16, I. 6; p. 20, I. 9-18; p. 42, I. 13 - p. 46, I. 3; p. 78, I. 22-25, p. 109, I. 24 - p. 112, I. 9). Where 
there is no dispute the parties intended to be bound only by a written agreement, no express contract 
is formed without the executed written agreement. See Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,400,582 
P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978). Evaluating the factors necessary to determine the intent of the parties 
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requires the conclusion that it was their mutual intent to enter into a written agreement. As to the 
first factor (whether the contract is one usually put in writing), the district court agreed that this type 
of contract usually should be put in writing, but asserted that EVCO often does not get them in 
writing. Cedar Street, however, does. Moreover, even Mr. Bauer testified he expected to have 
written contract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 15, l. 15 - p. 16, I. 6). The district court ignored, however, the great 
lengths Cedar Street took to prepare a contract and its testimony that it expected a written contract, 
either a purchase order or subcontract. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 42, 1.13 - p. 44, I. 25; p. 45, l. 20 - p. 46, I. 3). 
Additionally, Cedar Street's contract with Ormond Builders required that any agreement between 
EVCO and Cedar Street be in writing. (Ex. M). The statute of frauds also requires it. See Idaho 
Code § 28-2-201. The Project specifications also require a written subcontract§ 5.3. (Ex. N). 
Considering the second factor (whether there are few or many details), the district court 
incorrectly asserted that all of the details of the agreement were contained in the specifications. (R., 
p. 247). The specifications do not explain the scope of work to be performed by EVCO or any of 
the terms set forth by Cedar Street in its proposed subcontract. Based on the details regarding the 
scope of work and the terms proposed by Cedar Street, the specific details needed to be set forth in 
a written agreement, but were not. 
As to the third factor (whether the amount involved is large or small), the district court 
provided no opinion. However, a contract for any of the proposed prices ranging from $165,850, 
$170,161.00 or $132,688.04 in Exhibit 18 is a large amount of money. (Ex. 18). Further, Cedar 
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Street testified it expected to have a written contract because of the large amount of money and scope 
of work. (Tr. Vol. II, p.63, 1.17 - p.64, 1.7). 
Regarding the fourth factor (whether it requires a formal writing for a full expression of the 
covenants and promises), a writing was required to express the full agreement. Cedar Street desired 
a number of specific terms in its contract so that EVCO was bound to Cedar Street as Cedar Street 
was bound to Ormond Builders. The district court acknowledged only the price and scope as 
essential terms, but there is no dispute that Cedar Street wanted EVCO to be bound under the same 
terms as Cedar Street was bound to Ormond Builders. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 43, l. 17 - p.44, l. 25; Ex. M 
and Ex. F). 
Finally as to the fifth requirement (whether the negotiations indicate that a written draft is 
contemplated), the negotiations clearly indicated a written draft was to be the final conclusions of 
negotiations. As argued previously, Cedar Street, on several occasions, informed EVCO it expected 
a contract. Cedar Street indicated its intent to contract with a written agreement and sent EVCO a 
proposed subcontract. (Ex. 14 and Ex. F). Even EVCO concedes that it anticipated that a written 
contract would be the end result. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 20, l.15 - p. 21, l. 2). 
Although the district court repeatedly stated that Cedar Street directed EVCO to "start work," 
Cedar Street only requested that EVCO provide a very limited amount of materials, back cans (no 
labor was requested), and in the very same document asked that EVCO review the subcontract. 
Further, the district court found as determinative that "EVCO dictated the prices of the items on their 
subcontract with Cedar Street, and Cedar Street accepted those in making its bid to Ormond 
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Builders." (R., p. 247). This Court has previously rejected that a subcontractor's use of another 
parties' bid is acceptance of an offer. "It is a settled common law principle that utilizing a 
subcontractor's bid in submitting the prime or general contract bid does not, without more, constitute 
an acceptance of the subcontractor's offer conditioned upon being awarded the general contract by 
the awarding authority. Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396,399,582 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1978); see 
also C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assoc., Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 514, 414 P.2d 873, 879 (1966) 
("Mere use of respondent's bid is not tantamount to an acceptance."). Thus, this conclusion is in 
error and of no relevance. 
Based on Cedar Street and EVCO's repeated attempts to reach an agreement, including a 
review of contract documents, it is clear the parties intended their negotiations to conclude with a 
written contract. Just like Jntermountain, Mitchell and C.H. Leavell, no expressed contract between 
EVCO and Cedar Street existed because the required written mutual assent never occurred without 
an executed written agreement. 
Importantly, EVCO was in the unique position that it could have avoided this dispute by 
insisting upon and obtaining an executed a written subcontract or purchase order as a condition of 
supplying material or equipment to the Project. EVCO could have insisted on a fully executed joint 
check agreement. It did not. Seaboard respectfully requests that the case be reversed and remanded. 
B. The District Court Erred in Awarding EVCO Expectation Damages. 
The issue of damages is directly related to the contract formation issue raised above. In order 
to award expectation damages as it did, the Court must necessarily find "mutual assent" as to the 
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scope of work and the price to be paid EVCO. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts at section 
344 sets forth the three interests protected in the law of contract ( expectation interests, reliance 
interests, and restitution interests). Expectation damages are predicated upon the existence of an 
express agreement between parties to a contract and the benefit which the aggrieved party would 
have enjoyed, absent a breach by the other. Reliance interests, however, put the aggrieved party back 
into the same position as ifno contract had been formed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
§344(b). Finally, "restitution interests" restore to the aggrieved party the benefit conferred on the 
breaching party. Restatement (Second) a/Contracts, §344(c). 
As noted above, the district court found mutual assent by way of the conduct of the parties 
and thereby inferred an express contract and awarded EVCO its expectation damages. Seaboard 
submits that, at best, the evidence more appropriately established that Cedar Street and EVCO 
reached an implied in fact contract. Where an implied in fact contract is established, the recovery 
must be limited to the reasonable value of the materials and labor provided to the Project. In R.D. 
Bischoff v. Quang-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826, 748 P.2d 410 (1987), the court explained: 
Recovery is based on an implied in fact contract. An implied in fact contract is found 
where there is no express agreement but the conduct of the parties implies an 
agreement from which an obligation in contract exists .... The measure for recovery 
on quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the services rendered, not the value of 
the actual benefit realized and retained. Peavey v. Pellahdini, supra; see generally 
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.2 at 237 (1973). 
R.D, Bischoffv. Quang-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho at 829, 748 P.2d at 413. 
Assuming an implied in fact contract existed, EVCO's Exhibit 22 sets forth its reliance 
damages. Mr. Bauer admitted Exhibit 22 included all of the materials and labor tracked on the 
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Project, a total of$51,108.63. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25, I. 24 - p. 26, I. 2; p. 27, I. 11-24). Consequently, 
Cedar Street was paid in excess of its reliance damages. Seaboard submits that the Court should 
reverse the district court's grant of expectation damages awarded to EVCO. EVCO's recovery, if 
any should be limited to its implied in fact contract damages, i.e. "reliance damages," set forth in 
Exhibit 22. 
C. EVCO's Notice of Claim and Action Were Untimely under the Idaho Public Contract 
Bond Act. 
The district court erred as a matter oflaw because EVCO failed to submit its claim and file 
suit timely. EVCO's action against Seaboard is based solely as a claim against Seaboard's payment 
bond provided pursuant to the Idaho Public Contract Bond Act (the "Act"), Idaho Code § 54-1925 
et seq. By its Complaint, EVCO alleged it entered into a written subcontract with Cedar Street 
Electric on the Project and is therefore a "claimant" under the Act. (R., p. 3). EVCO acknowledged 
that it was required to comply with the 90-day notice requirement of § 54-1927, (Attached as 
Appendix A), (Ex. 2; R., p. 3, Complaint,i 12) and the one year suit limitation set forth in the bond. 
EVCO provided a Notice of Claim to the General Contractor, Ormond Builders, which was 
received by Ormond Builders on June 13, 2005. (Ex. 2). Pursuant to EVCO's Notice and EVCO's 
counsel's correspondence to Seaboard of September 29, 2005 (Ex. 2), EVCO claimed its last work 
was "training" provided to the Owner on April 15, 2005. 8 The Idaho Public Contracts Bond Act was 
8 EVCO later alleged its last work occurred in June 15, 2005, when it allegedly delivered 
"as-built" drawings to someone relating to the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 45, 1. 4-15). Neither the as-
built drawings nor the transmittal of the drawings were introduced into evidence at trial, therefore 
this argument should not be considered by this Court on appeal. EVCO also alleged some 
changes to the TV system were made in April of 2005. Seaboard assumes for the purposes of its 
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enacted to protect suppliers and subcontractors providing labor and materials to public works 
projects. This purpose was discussed in detail in LeGrand Steel Products Co. v. A.S. C. 
Constructors, Inc., 108 Idaho 817, 702 P.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1985), where the Court stated: 
Idaho Code § 54-1925 et seq., the "Public Contracts Bond Act," is substantially 
similar to 40 U.S.C. § 270a et seq., commonly known as the Miller Act. Both the 
federal and state statutes were enacted to protect persons who furnish labor or 
materials to public works projects. The statutes serve a remedial purpose. Normally, 
in private construction projects, those who furnish labor and materials without 
receiving payment may file and foreclose mechanics' liens. However, because such 
liens cannot be asserted against public property, the payment bond is required by 
statute. 
The scope of statutory protection is limited to two categories of potential claimants. 
First, those who have a direct contractual relationship with the prime contractor may 
recover against the payment bond. Second, those who have a direct contractual 
relationship with one of the prime contractor's "subcontractors" also may recover. 
See I.C. § 54-1927 and 40 U.S.§ 270 b; 
LeGrand Steel, 108 Idaho at 818. 
Both the Idaho Lien statute I.C. § 45-501 and the Act at I.C. §54-1927, provide relief to 
subcontractors and suppliers for labor and materials incorporated into an improvement. The Lien 
statute allows a lien for claimants "performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the 
construction ... " Likewise the Act provides that a claimant "who has furnished labor or material 
... in the prosecution of the work ... " has a claim against the payment bond. Thus, the question 
before the court is whether EVCO' s claimed actions in training school district personnel on systems, 
argument, that these allegations may be considered true, i.e., EVCO trained people on April 15, 
2005, and fine-tuned the TV system in April 2005. Seaboard submits these actions do not 
constitute furnishing "labor or materials ... in the prosecution of the work" sufficient to extend 
the deadline to provide notice of a proper bond claim or bring an action on the bond. 
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fine-tuning the TV system or allegedly providing "as-built" drawings9 constitute "labor or materials" 
for which it could assert a claim against the bond. Seaboard respectfully submits they are not. 
Perhaps the most compelling testimony regarding the status of the work on the Project came 
from the Project Architect, Scott Fisher. Mr. Fisher testified that he or his staff reviewed the 
progress of the construction to certify the percentage of completion on a monthly basis. Mr. Fisher's 
testimony is found at pages 226 through 236 ofVolume II of the Transcript regarding the completion 
of the Project and regarding Exhibit Q, which are the final pay applications. The School District 
took possession of the Project on January 28, 2005, at which time all of the electrical systems, 
including those for which EVCO supplied material and some labor, were completed and functional. 
Reviewing Mr. Fisher's testimony, and Pay Application No. 11, Ex. Q, dated February 17, 2005, 
Mr. Fisher certified all of the electrical systems as I 00% complete as of March 1, 2005. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 230, I. 17 - p. 231, I. 22; Ex. Q). Certainly there was punchlist and warranty work, as well as 
landscaping work to be completed, however, all of the electrical "work" was completed. Seaboard 
respectfully submits EVCO's claim to have performed "work" after March 1, 2005, amounted to no 
more than punch-list, warranty or incidental work, which would not extend the date to file a Notice 
of Claim or file suit on the bond. 
9 As-built drawings are defined as follows: "Record drawings made during construction. 
As-built drawings record the locations, sizes and nature of concealed items such as structural 
elements, accessories, equipment, devices, plumbing lines, valves, mechanical equipment, and 
the like. These records (with dimensions) for a permanent record for future reference." R. S. 
Means, Means Illustrated Construction Dictionary, 3rd ed., 2000. 
37 
Although there are few Idaho cases construing the Public Contracts Bond Act notice and bar 
date provisions, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that consideration of federal decisions under the 
Miller Act is appropriate when construing the Idaho Public Contracts Bond Act. See Beco Corp. v. 
Roberts &Sons Const. Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 704,712,760 P.2d 1120, 1128 (1988). The many Miller 
Act decisions addressing this issue conclude that punch-list or warranty work do not extend those 
dates and the conclusion that work was performed pursuant to a contractual obligation is not 
determinative as to whether such work qualifies to extend the notice and bar dates. See also General 
Electric Co. v. Webco Const. Co., 164 Colo. 232, 239, 433 P.2d 760, 763 (Colo. 1967) 
(miscellaneous work such as touch-up painting and patching after substantial completion of school 
not sufficient to extend bar date to bring suit on bond); US. ex rel PRN Associates, Inc. v. K & S 
Enterprises, Inc., 2007 WL 925267 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2007). 
In US.A. ex. rel. Interstate Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. International Fidelity Insurance 
Co., 200 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a timeliness issue 
similar to that presently before this Court. In International Fidelity, the Sixth Circuit determined 
the issue of when the one-year statute of limitations commenced under the Miller Act. The 
contractor completed its work in early June 1994 and the government took occupancy of the project 
on June 17, 1994. Thereafter, a subcontractor of the plaintiff, returned to the Project to conduct 
testing and the subcontractor ultimately replaced several pieces of equipment. The replaced 
equipment was then retested on October 18, 1994. Exactly one year after the last testing of the 
replaced equipment, the plaintiff filed suit, on October 18, 1995. International Fidelity, 200 F .3d 
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at 458. The Sixth Circuit answered the question of"when the last labor was performed or material 
supplied" for purposes of the commencement of the statute oflimitations holding that the initial date 
of substantial completion as the operative date. The International Fidelity court stated: 
We agree with the majority of courts that have interpreted the phrase and have 
concluded it connotes more than mere substantial completion or substantial 
performance of the plaintiffs obligations under its contract. See United States ex rel. 
Austin v. Western Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568,572 (9th Cir.1964). Furthermore, we 
agree that work done at the request of the government and pursuant to a warranty, 
subsequent to final inspection and acceptance of the project, falls outside the 
meaning of labor performed as set forth in § 270b(b ). If post-completion work 
performed pursuant to a warranty could toll the Miller Act's statute of limitations, 
then the surety would have no repose until all such warranties expired .... 
The majority of circuits that have addressed this issue have held that remedial or 
corrective work or materials, or inspection of work already completed,falls outside 
the meaning of"lahor" or "materials" under§ 270b(b). Hence,performing such 
work or supplying such materials will not toll the Miller Act's one-year statute of 
limitations. See, e.g., United States for the use of Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J. T. 
Constr. Co., Inc., 517 F.Supp. 1178, ll81 (E.D. Pa.1981), affd. 688 F.2d 827 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856, 103 S.Ct. 126, 74 L.Ed.2d 109 (1982); United 
States for the use of Magna Masonry,Jnc., v. R. T. Woodfield, Inc., 709 F .2d 249, 250 
(4th Cir.1983); United States ex rel. Austin v. Western Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568, 572 
(9th Cir.1964); United States for the use of State Elec. Supply Co. v. Hesse/den 
Constr. Co., 404 F.2d 774, 776 (10th Cir.1968). The majority rule requires the 
trier of fact to distinguish "whether the work was performed ... as a 'part of the 
original contract' or for the 'purpose of correcting defects, or making repairs 
following inspection of the project'" Austin, 337 F.2d at 572-73 (quoting United 
States ex rel. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gunnar l Johnson & Son, Inc., 310 F.2d 899,903 
(8th Cir.1962)). 
International Fidelity, 200 F.3d at 459-60 (emphasis added). 
The court then addressed the identical argument asserted by EVCO in this case. Namely, that 
its "contractual obligations" which might require additional work beyond the date of substantial 
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completion should extend the notice and bar dates. In rejecting the argument as made by EVCO and 
adopted by the district court at Conclusions of Law ,r 3 - 5, the court in International Fidelity stated: 
A contractor's duties under a contract may extend, by virtue of warranty or other 
obligation, to a point in time far beyond that date when the project has been 
completed and the "last of the labor was performed or material was supplied" for 
purposes of the Miller Act. Interstate's argument would have this Court interpret the 
Miller Act to equate the term "labor" to the term "contractual duties." As a result, 
the statute of limitations period would commence only after the end of the warranty 
period, perhaps many years after the project's completion. To interpret the Miller 
Act as Interstate suggests would frustrate the policy of repose that the limitations 
period serves, and we find no support for such a construction in the Miller Act's text, 
legislative history, or in the applicable case Jaw. We thus reject Interstate's proposed 
construction as contrary to the Act's language and underlying policy. 
International Fidelity, 200 F.3d at 461. 
The evidence at trial established, and it is undisputed, that the School District took possession 
of the Project on January 28, 2005, and began holding class from that date forward. All of the low-
level electrical systems were tested, inspected, training conducted and were operational as of that 
date. EVCO's actions in performing additional training, fine-tuning the TV system10 or providing 
as-built drawings should not be considered "labor or materials ... in the prosecution of the work" 
under I.C. §54-1927, for the same reasons cited in International Fidelity, 200 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 
2000). EVCO's Notice of Claim, dated June 8, 2005, was untimely, as was the commencement of 
this action on March 10, 2006. 
As noted above, the Idaho Public Bonds Act was enacted to serve the same purpose as the 
Idaho Mechanics and Materialmans Lien provisions only in the context of public works. Idaho 
10 The district court found that EVCO "installed" the TV system on April 15, 2005, but 
the testimony regarding the TV system was that it was installed and working, but was balanced in 
April for optimal performance. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 38, I. 8-21). 
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Courts may draw from the lien statute in construing the Bond Act. See LeGrand Steel Products, 108 
Idaho at 819; 702 P.2d at 857. Certainly, it is well settled law in Idaho that substantial completion 
is a construction milestone, which properly commences the time deadline to record a mechanics lien 
against a private works project. This proposition was announced as early as the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in H W. Johns-Mannville Co. v. Allen, 37 Idaho 153, 215 P. 840 (1923), and was 
clearly articulated in Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 506 P .2d 455 (1972). In Mitchell, the 
plaintiff constructed an auto dealership for the defendant, Flandro, and the architect signed a 
certificate of substantial completion dated November l 0, 1964. However, the plaintiff contractor 
continued work through January 2, 1965, and recorded its lien on March 11, 1965. Ultimately, the 
trial court determined the lien was untimely based upon the substantial completion date. This court 
upheld the decision stating; 
It is established that 'trivial' work done or materials furnished after the contract 
has been substantially completed will not extend the time in which a lien claim can 
be filed under LC. 45-507. As well articulated in Gem State Lumber Co. v. Whitty, 
37 Idaho 489,217 p. 1027: 
'While the time fixed in the contract for the completion of a building is not 
controlling against laborers or materialmen, it has a direct bearing upon the time 
when the building was to be completed under the contract, so that the time for filing 
liens for material and labor would begin to run. The statute provides that this time 
shall be computed from the date of the last item of material furnished, or from the 
last work performed. The rule very generally, prevails that such time begins to run 
from a substantial completion of the contract, and that new items thereafter added to 
the account will not extend the time in which to claim a lien or revive a lien already 
expired. The more difficult question is to determine when under this doctrine the 
contract has been completed. By the weight of authority, this is to be ascertained by 
the conditions of the contract, the conduct of the parties with reference thereto, and 
the surrounding facts and circumstances. (Citations omitted). 
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'Ordinarily, furnishing an article or performing a seITice trivial in character is not 
sufficient to extend the time for claiming a lien or to revive an expired lien, where 
the article is furnished or the service rendered after a substantial completion of the 
contract, and the article is not expressly required by the terms thereof.' Gem State 
Lbr. Co. v. Whitty, supra, at 499, 217 P. at 1030.(Emphasis added). 
Since it is undisputed that the contract was substantially completed on November 10, 
1964, and since the trial court found inadequate proof that any material or substantial 
work was performed or supplies furnished after that date which would extend the 
time for filing a lien, we conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the 
lien was not timely filed. H W. Johns-Manville Co. v. Allen, 37 ldaho 153,215 P. 
840 (l 923). 
Mitchell, 95 Idaho at 231-32; 506 P.2d at 458-59 (emphasis added). 
With respect to the Project at hand, it is undisputed that the architect certified all of the low-
voltage systems on which EVCO provided material and some labor, as l 00% complete as of March 
l, 2005. (Ex. Q). The School District began utilizing the building as a functioning school as of 
January 28, 2005. EVCO's actions in training of School District personnel, fine-tuning of the TV 
systems, or providing as-built drawings should not extend the deadline for EVCO's 90-day notice 
under the Act, or the limitation on which it was required to bring suit. 
Noteworthy, is Mr. Bauer's testimony, that EVCO bills or invoices for its work only after it 
has completed the work identified in the invoice. Stated otherwise, EVCO's invoices reflect labor 
or materials supplied as of the date of the invoice. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 24, l. 3-22). In its Proof of Claim 
to Seaboard, EVCO certified its claim and supporting documentation under penalty of perjury. (Ex. 
2). Therein, EVCO submitted its billing invoices as attachment b, and its "Final Billing on Project", 
invoice No. 6710 was dated February 11, 2005. Because there is no dispute that it was EVCO's 
practice to bill for work only after it had been completed, and no evidence was presented regarding 
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this invoice to conflict with this conclusion, it must be inferred that the work reflected in this invoice 
had already been completed by that date. lfEVCO's last true work on the Project was completed 
on or before Invoice No. 6710 dated February 11, 2005, then its Notice was mailed 117 days after 
its last labor and materials and received 122 days thereafter, i.e. untimely. The only way to save its 
claim from a challenge as to timeliness was to submit a "revised" final bill with a different date that 
would render the claim timely. In order to change the last day of work, so as to render the notice and 
filing of suit timely, EVCO resubmitted this invoice at trial as Exhibit 20 with a new date March 22, 
2005. Review of the invoice clearly demonstrates that the work was completed prior to the February 
11, 2005, date and that the claim was therefore untimely. Seaboard submits EVCO's sworn proof 
of claim and "Final Billing" invoice dated February 11, 2005, prove its notice and claim were 
untimely. 
D. The Idaho Statute of Frauds Bars EVCO's Claim Against Seaboard. 
The district court ignored the plain language of Idaho Code § 28-2-201 in holding that 
EVCO's claim was not barred by the statute of frauds. As noted in Seaboard's Motion for 
Involuntary Dismissal, the Idaho Statute of Frauds, Idaho Code § 28-2-201, requires any contract for 
the purchase and sale of goods in excess of$500.00 to be in writing and signed by the party against 
whom the enforcement is sought (i.e., Cedar Street). (R., p. 268). Moreover, the Project 
specifications required such contracts to be in writing. (Ex. N, p. 23). In its conclusions of law, 
however, the district court held the exception set forth at§ 28-2-201(2) took the transaction out of 
the statute of frauds because there was no written objection by Cedar Street and both parties were 
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"merchants." Additionally, the district court held that§ 28-2-201(3)(c) took the matter outside of 
the statute of frauds, because payment had been received. Seaboard contends the district court's 
conclusions of law were erroneous. 
l. The Exception 28-2-201(2) Does Not Apply to Seaboard. 
The Statute of Frauds code exception found at subsection (2) states: 
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the 
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has 
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (l) against 
such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten (l 0) 
days after it is received. 
Idaho Statute of Frauds § 28-2-201 (2). Although Seaboard could not find relevant case law 
interpreting this language, it is likely because the plain text is clear and simple to apply. The 
exception does not apply as against a third party - Seaboard. 
In this matter, at least as to its case against Seaboard, EVCO is attempting to assert claimed 
contract entitlement against Seaboard's bond. The exception at 28-2-201(2) appears to only relate 
to Cedar Street, a party to the proposed transaction. Perhaps it could be argued the exception applies 
as to claims against Cedar Street, but that issue is irrelevant. Seaboard should be entitled to the 
protections of Idaho Code§ 28-2-201(1) based on its clear and unambiguous meaning. Official 
comment No. 3, supports Seaboard's construction. 
2. The LC. § 28-2-201(3)(c) Exception for Payment. 
With respect to the exceptions set forth at§ 28-2-201(3)(c), EVCO's alleged contract was 
taken out of the statute of frauds because it has been paid for its performance. If such is the case, 
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then its claims against Seaboard fails, because it has been paid for its performance. As with the 
previous exception, such may be valid as against a statute of frauds defense asserted by Cedar Street, 
but not Seaboard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Seaboard respectfully requests that the case be reversed and 
remanded for an Order to be entered setting forth that EVCO's notice and claim are untimely, no 
express contract was formed between EVCO and Cedar Street, and EVCO has already been paid its 
reliance measure of damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jJ_ 11t day of August, 2008. 
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Appendix A 
54-1927. Claims for labor or material furnished or equipment 
supplied - Suit on contractor's payment bond - Procedure -
Limitation. - Every claimant who has furnished labor or material or 
rented, leased, or otherwise supplied equipment in the prosecution of the 
work provided for in such contract in respect of which a payment bond is 
furnished under this act, and who has not been paid in full therefor before 
the expiration of a period of ninety (90) days after the day on which the last 
of the labor was done or performed by him or material or equipment was 
furnished or supplied by him for which such claim is made, shall have the 
right to sue on such payment bond for the amount, or the balance thereof, 
unpaid at the time of institution of such suit and to prosecute such action to 
final judgment for the sum or sums justly due him and have execution 
thereon; provided, however, that any such claimant having a direct contrac-
tual relationship with a subcontractor of the contractor furnishing such 
payment bond but no contractual relationship expressed or implied with 
such contractor shall not have a right of action upon such payment bond 
unless he has given written notice to such contractor within ninety (90) days 
from the date on which such claimant performed the last of the labor or 
furnished or supplied the last of the material for which such claim is made, 
stating with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the 
person to whom the material or equipment was furnished or supplied or for 
whom the labor was done or performed. Each notice shall be served by 
mailing the same by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an 
envelope addressed to the contractor at any place he maintains an office or 
conducts his business or at his residence. 
The contracting body and the agent in charge of its office, is authorized 
and directed to furnish, to anyone making application therefor who submits 
an affidavit that he has supplied labor, equipment, or materials for such 
work and payment therefor has not been made or that he is being sued on 
any such bond, or that it is the surety thereon, a certified copy of such bond 
and the contract for which it was given, which copy shall be prima,facie 
evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original. Applicants 
shall pay for such certified copies such reasonable fees as the contracting 
body or the agent in charge of its office fixes to cover the actual cost of the 
preparation thereof 
Every suit instituted on the aforesaid payment bond shall be brought in 
appropriate court in any county in which the contract was to be performed 
and not elsewhere; provided, however, that no such suit shall be commenced 
after the expiration of one' (1) year from the date on which the claimant 
performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the last of the 
material or equipment for which such suit is brought, except, that if the 
claimant is a subcontractor of the contractor, no such suit shall be com-
menced after the expiration of one (1) year from the date on which final 
payment under the subcontract became due. [1965, ch. 28, § 3, p. 43; am. 
1980, ch. 199, § 2, p. 460.] 

